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The Qāḍī Before the Judge:  
The Social Use of Eschatology in Muslim Courts 
 
 
Mathieu Tillier 
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It was [also] said that the reason why Iblīs perished was 
that before Adam, the jinn were on earth. God sent Iblīs to 
act among them as judge (qāḍī). He did so with fairness (bi-
l-ḥaqq) for a thousand years, so that he eventually was called 
“arbiter” (ḥakam). God called him thus and revealed to him 
his name. At that, he became filled with haughtiness. He 
became self-important and caused terror, hostility, and 
hatred among those to whom God had sent him as arbiter. 
This is assumed to have caused them to fight so bitterly on 
earth for two thousand years that their horses waded in the 
blood of [those killed].1 
 
The imagery of Muslim eschatology has long been neglected by historians, who regarded it 
as folkloric and without historical significance. Scholars have recently begun to take a 
renewed interest in eschatological thought. The Muslim conception of the hereafter is now 
better understood thanks to Christian Lange’s study of punishment in the Muslim 
imagination. In describing the map of hell, its creatures and the tortures they inflicted to the 
condemned,2 Lange followed the footsteps of major contributions to the history of Occidental 
representations, such as Le Goff’s original history of the Purgatory in the 1980s.3 Le Goff 
argued that the imagery of the afterlife was closely linked to terrestrial judicial realities. “The 
other world was supposed to correct the inequalities and injustices of this one.”4 Similarly, 
Lange highlights the importance of high-ranking Muslims, whether they be religious scholars 
or rulers, who appear in the eschatological ḥadīth related to hell. The interpretation of such 
traditions, however, is problematic. Lange suggests that traditions promising punishment of 
unjust rulers in the hereafter can be interpreted as encouraging an attitude of political quietism 
in this world. On the other hand, he also shows that eschatological traditions express anger 
                                                     
1 Al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk (éd. M.J. de Goeje; Leiden: Brill, 1879–1901), 1:85. Trans. F. 
Rosenthal, in The History of al-Ṭabarī, Volume 1: General Introduction and From the Creation to the Flood 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 256–57 (with adaptations).  
2 C. Lange, Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Muslim Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), part. II. 
3 J. Le Goff, La naissance du Purgatoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1980). 
4 Ibid., 284. 
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and resentment against the state apparatus, and that they potentially embody criticisms against 
the social and political status quo.5 I have elsewhere argued that traditions describing qāḍīs in 
hell were put into circulation by traditionalists insisting on the personal responsibility of 
judges, and that they had to be interpreted within the framework of a broader discourse that 
highlighted the necessity of judicial independence of qāḍīs.6  
Literature depicting qāḍīs in the afterlife is of particular interest, for they represent one of 
the main categories of officials described as appearing before God on Judgment Day. In a 
striking reversal of fortune, the earthly judge becomes the defendant before the supreme 
Judge. In this paper, I will mainly draw on biographical dictionaries and chronicles referring 
to Muslim courts of the ninth and tenth centuries C.E. to cast a question on the social use of 
this image. Whereas Le Goff argues that justice in the hereafter largely mirrors the model of 
earthly justice,7 I shall attempt to show that the representation of God’s justice was in fact 
used as a religious expedient to reform the behavior of the judiciary and of the judicial 
organization. My argument is that allusions to eschatological indictments of Muslim judges 
went beyond literary and theoretical dimensions; they also had direct impact on judicial 
practices. Incessant reminder of how judges will themselves be judged on Judgment Day 
played an important role on the shaping and re-shaping of Islamic courtrooms.  
 
1.  Introductory Remarks: Courtrooms as Gateways to Hell 
 
Since early Islam, Muslim jurists regarded courts as more than just a place where earthly 
disputes were resolved. They were a place where the spiritual destiny of people appearing 
before the qāḍī was also at stake. According to certain jurists, litigants should not comply 
with wrongfully entered verdicts by a judge. For example, if a divorced woman failed to 
prove her case against her husband and the qāḍī judged that she was still married to the man 
who had divorced her, the husband would be committing fornication (zinā) if he continued 
having sexual intercourse with her. He would therefore have to answer to God for his crime.8  
Moreover, the judicial procedure relied to a large extent on the fear of hell. If a claimant 
could not prove his right by testimonies (bayyina), the judge would ask the defendant to take 
oath. If he swore that he was innocent, the judge passed a decision in his favor. If the 
defendant refused to take oath, the judge could either pass judgment against him or defer the 
oath to the claimant. Either way, taking oath was a dangerous thing to do, since it potentially 
exposed the swearer to God’s wrath; the perjurer would have to answer to God in the 
hereafter.9 Narratives describe early qāḍīs as semi-legendary Shurayḥ, reminding defendants 
                                                     
5 Lange, Justice, 161. 
6 M. Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside (132/750-334/945) (Damascus: Ifpo, 2009), 625–31. 
7 Le Goff, La naissance du Purgatoire, 297–98. 
8 Al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-umm (ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib; 11 vols.; al-Manṣūra: Dār al-wafā’, 2001), 
8:97–98. Al-Shāfiʿī mentions however that other unnamed jurists disagree with this position and consider that 
the qāḍī’s decision can allow what in truth should be forbidden and forbid what in truth should be allowed. Al-
Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-umm, 8:101–2. 
9 J. Pedersen and Y. Linant de Bellefonds, “Ḳasam,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (2d ed.), 4:687. 
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that they would go to hell if they committed perjury.10 Fear of involuntary perjury was a 
major reason for litigants’ refusal to take oath.11 
Likewise, testimony was the most powerful type of evidence. Qāḍīs relied largely on the 
words of witnesses to pass judgment. Witnesses testified before the court without swearing to 
tell the truth, and, until late eighth century C.E., judges had few means of verifying their 
reliability. It was therefore only natural for qāḍīs to repeatedly admonish witnesses, 
reminding them that they were the actual judges in the case.12 In Kūfa, around the year 
105/723, Muḥārib b. Dithār once warned dubious witnesses by citing prophetic ḥadīths stating 
that false witnesses were destined for hell.13 Unlike those under oath, witnesses were not 
always conscious of the danger of their position, and such admonitions were apparently 
successful in early Muslim society sensitive to eschatological expectations. In Muḥārib b. 
Dithār’s case for example, witnesses retracted their testimony. In a society where institutional 
means were scarce, it is likely that arousing eschatological fear was one of the only means of 
maintaining order and imposing compliance with law. 
What is striking is that eschatological fear was not only instilled from above by state 
institutions, but also manipulated by its subjects. In Islamic sources mainly written by 
religious scholars who did not immediately belong to the ruling class, qāḍīs appear as the 
main target of God’s wrath on Judgment Day. 
 
2. Qāḍīs Before God: Ḥadīth and Its Interpretation 
 
2.1. Non-Muslim Antecedents 
Dispensing justice gives the judge an enormous power over society; this authority can 
sometimes lead to great temptations. It is no wonder, therefore, that different civilizations 
shared the motif of judges being themselves accountable before divine forces. In late antique 
Christianity, canon laws already insisted on the ecclesiastical judge’s responsibility in the 
hereafter. In the Didascalia apostolorum, a pseudo-apostolic text written in Greek in the third 
century C.E. and translated into Syriac in the early fourth century, deacons and bishops who 
were asked to arbitrate disputes between Christians are repeatedly warned against the 
temptation of partiality: “You shall render an account in the day of the Lord,”14 “Let them be 
judged before you as you also are surely to be judged,”15 “Thus judge as you also are surely to 
be judged.”16 If a judge only listens to one party in the absence of the other and condemns the 
defendant on the basis of false testimonies, the judge “shall be partner before God of him that 
                                                     
10 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt (ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī; 3 vols.; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-saʿāda, 1947–
1950), 2:318. 
11 See for example Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:10. 
12 Ibn Saʿd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā (8 vols.; Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1968), 6:133, 136; Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 
2:354–55. Cf. R. Brunschvig, “Le système de la prevue en droit musulman,” in Études d’islamologie (2 vols.; 
Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976), 2:207. 
13 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:34. 
14 A. Vööbus, ed. and trans., The Didascalia Apostolorum in Syriac (2 vols.; Louvain: CSCO, 1979), 
1:122/2:115. 
15 Ibid., 1:130/2:121. 
16 Ibid., 1:132/2:122. See also A. Vööbus, ed. and trans., The Synodicon in the West Syrian Tradition (2 vols.; 
Louvain: CSCO, 1976), 2:156. 
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brought the false witness and with him [he] shall be tormented by God.”17 “And if you have 
justly judged, you shall receive the reward of justice from God, both now and in that [world] 
to come. But if you have judged unjustly, so also shall you receive of God a retribution.”18 
The idea of permanent divine surveillance of the judge and of his accountability before God 
was already nascent in the Gospel of Matthew quoted in the Didascalia: “With what judgment 
you judge, you shall be judged” (Matt 7: 2).19 A few centuries later, East-Syriac canon law 
developed the same idea, drawing explicit parallels between the earthly judge and the divine 
One.20 The synod of the catholicos Ezechiel in 57621 demanded that priests remain 
incorruptible when dispensing justice, for “their judgment is the judgment of God”; for a 
judge, accepting a gift within a lawsuit would signify “his own condemnation” and “would 
provoke the ire of God” (nʿayar ʿalaw l-rūgzō alōhōyō).22 
 
2.2. Muslim Ḥadīths and Non-Prophetic Reports 
In Islam, a series of ḥadīths (prophetic reports) depicting Muslim judges on Judgment Day 
were probably put into circulation during the course of the eighth century C.E. and collected 
systematically by authors of biographic works on qāḍīs in the ninth and early tenth 
centuries.23 Inclusion of these reports in biographies or books dedicated to qāḍīs is of 
particular significance; such books cannot be read as simple “histories” of Muslim judgeship 
as they reformulate their history in order to reshape the judicial institution according to the 
prevailing ideologies and representations of their authors’ time. From this perspective, 
insistence on trial of qāḍīs in the hereafter is particularly striking in Wakīʿ’s Akhbār al-quḍāt, 
a three-volume history of judges from several provinces (especially Medina, Baṣra and Kūfa) 
up until the third/ninth century. Here we shall examine these reports. 
1. Under the authority of a long chain of transmitters ending with al-Shaʿbī < Masrūq < Ibn 
Masʿūd < Prophet: “Any judge who has dispensed justice among people will be brought by an 
angel holding him by his neck on the Day of resurrection. [The angel] will secure him on the 
edge of hell (jahannam), and will then raise his head. If he is told “throw him!,” he will throw 
him in an abyss in which [the judge] will be falling down during? forty springs.”24 
                                                     
17 Vööbus, Didascalia Apostolorum, 1:135/2:124. 
18 Vööbus, Didascalia Apostolorum, 1:138/2:126. See also Vööbus, Synodicon, 2:157/159. 
19 Vööbus, Didascalia Apostolorum, 1:133/2:123; Vööbus, Synodicon, 2:165/170. 
20 .̣ܘܗ ܐܗܠܐܕ ܐܢܝܕܕ ܠܛܡ J.-B. Chabot, ed. and trans., Synodicon Orientale ou Recueil de synodes nestoriens 
(Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1902), 123/382. 
21 See J. Dauvillier, “Chaldéen (droit),” in Dictionnaire du droit canonique (ed. R. Naz ; Paris: Librairie 
Letouzey et Ané, 1942), 3:320–21. On the catholicos Ezechiel, see ʿAmr b. Mattā, Akhbār faṭārika kursī al-
mashriq min Kitāb al-majdal, in Maris Amri et Slibae, De Patriarchis Nestorianorum Commentaria (ed. H. 
Gismondi; 2 vols.; Rome: F. de Luigi, 1896), 2:43–44. 
22 Chabot, Synodicon Orientale, 123/382. It is noteworthy that a similar theme was later developed in a 
thirteen-century Coptic legal manual in which Ibn al-ʿAssāl (d. before 658/1260) threatens the bad ecclesiastical 
judge with God’s wrath and reminds him that God will ask him about his judicial practice on the Last Day [Ibn 
al-ʿAssāl, Kitāb al-qawānīn (ed. Jirjīs Fīlūthā’ūs ʿAwḍ; Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-tawfīq, n.d.), 363]. 
23 Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, 627–28. 
24 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:19. Ḥadīths depicting similar situations do not usually mention qāḍīs, but rather 
“men (presumably amīrs) in charge of ten people [or more].” See for example al-Ṭabarānī, al-Muʿjam al-kabīr 
(20 vols.; Mosul: Maktabat al-zahrā’, 1983), 12:135. 
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2. Shurayḥ b. ʿUbayd < [Anonymous] b. Masrūq < Muʿādh b. Jabal < Prophet: “Let the 
qāḍī slip in hell on a sledge longer than the way to Aden.”25  
3. Ṣafwān b. Sulaym < al-Aʿraj < Abū Hurayra < Prophet: “Any of God’s creatures who 
dispenses justice among three [people] will be brought on the Day of Judgment with his hands 
tied up to his neck. Justice (al-ʿadl) will either unfasten his bounds or give him up [to hell].”26 
4. Ṣāliḥ b. Sarḥ < ʿImrān b. Ḥiṭṭān < ʿĀ’isha < Prophet: “The just qāḍī will be brought on 
the Day of Judgment and he will receive such a punishment that he will wish he had never 
judged between two litigants.”27 
Wakīʿ quotes non-prophetic reports that follow the same idea. Muḥammad b. Wāsiʿ (a 
famous Baṣrian ascetic, d. 123 or 127/740–41 or 744–45)28 is supposed to have heard from an 
anonymous source: “The first to be called for judgment (ḥisāb) on the Day of Resurrection 
will be the qāḍīs.”29 This reports is modeled on prophetic traditions in which the first to be 
judged are Adam,30 the angel Isrāfīl31 or even the Prophet Muḥammad himself.32 Some 
reports mention that the punishment of bad qāḍīs will even begin before the Last Judgment, 
while the judge is still in his tomb. “When the arbiter (ḥakam) dies, every judgment he passed 
will be presented before him in his tomb. If there is any disagreement about one of his 
decisions, he will be beaten so hard with an iron rod (mirzaba min al-ḥadīd) that his tomb will 
cough.”33 
Muslim traditions depicting qāḍīs on Judgment Day do not describe physical confrontation 
with God. Moreover, these judges/defendants have no adversary in the form of claimants. The 
reader infers God’s presence in the passages, but His presence is only represented by His 
servants, who execute His silent decision. The divine courtroom is not the mere reproduction 
of an earthly one. Beyond the theological reasons which could explain the absence of God’s 
physical representation in these reports, procedures followed at the divine court are 
ontologically different to those prescribed by earthly courts. Whereas a Muslim judge must 
                                                     
25 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:20. 
26 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:20. Cf. Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnu’ūṭ and 
ʿĀdil Murshid; 52 vols.; Beirut: Mu’assasat al-risāla, 1995), 36:635; 37:444; al-Dārimī, Sunan al-Dārimī, 
(Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī, 1407 H.), 2:313. In these books, the ḥadīth does not deal with qāḍīs but with 
amīrs.  
27 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:21. Cf. Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān (ed. Shuʿayb al-Arna’ūṭ; 18 vols.; Beirut: 
Mu’assasat al-risāla, 1993), 11:439; al-Bayḥaqī, Sunan al-Bayḥaqī al-kubrā (ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir 
ʿAṭā; 10 vols.; Mecca: Dār al-bāz, 1994), 10:96. 
28 Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt (ed. al-Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn Aḥmad; 9 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1975), 7:366; idem, 
Mashāhīr ʿulamā’ al-amṣār (ed. Majdī b. Manṣūr b. Sayyid al-Shūrā; Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1995), 
180; al-Dhahabī, Siyar aʿlām al-nubalā’ (ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnā’ūṭ and Muḥammad Nuʿaym al-ʿAraqsūsī; 23 
vols.; Beirut: Mu’assasat al-risāla, 1413 H.), 6:119; Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb (14 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 
1984), 9:441. According to Ibn Ḥajar, Muḥammad b. Wāsiʿ served as a chief of the police (ṣāḥib al-shurṭa) in 
Baṣra, but always refused to become a qāḍī. 
29 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:22. 
30 Al-Bukhārī, al-Ṣaḥīḥ (ed. Muṣṭafā Dīb al-Bughā; 6 vols.; al-Yamāma-Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1987), 
5:2392; Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, 14:488. 
31 Ibn al-Mubārak, Kitāb al-zuhd (ed. Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-Aʿẓamī; Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2004), 
433. On this angel, see A.J. Wensinck, “Isrāfīl,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (2d ed.), 4:211. 
32 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir al-uṣūl fī maʿrifat aḥādīth al-rasūl (2 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-jīl, 1992), 2:57. 
33 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:32. 
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rely on external evidence such as testimonies and oaths that can be misleading, God’s all-
embracing knowledge allows him to judge rightly and immediately, without need for any 
further evidence.  
 
2.3. Traditions and Their Historical Context 
Parallels between Christian and Muslim traditions do not mean that the Islamic imagery of 
qāḍīs appearing before God on the Last Day is necessarily influenced by Christian (or other 
religious) representations. Both Christians and Muslims shared eschatological expectations in 
which God’s judgment (the etymological meaning of the word “dīn”) was a major component. 
It is possible that both legal systems reached the logical conclusion that judges, more than 
anyone else, should be accountable for their individual choices and decisions before God’s 
celestial court. Islamic traditions must therefore be read in the historical context of their 
production.  
These ḥadīths can be interpreted in two complementary ways. On the one hand, Joseph van 
Ess suggests that these traditions were put into circulation by legal experts belonging to the 
class of mawālī (clients, i.e., non-Arab Muslims). They were meant to be warnings against 
Arab judges who usually monopolized judgeship in the Umayyad and early Abbasid period. 
These legal experts considered many of the early qāḍīs to be incompetent, and as a kind of 
social revenge, they tried to frighten them by insisting on their personal responsibility before 
God.34  
 In turn, these traditions also served the qāḍīs themselves. I have argued elsewhere that 
such reports should be read in the context of repeated attempts by the qāḍīs to detach 
themselves from political rulers and to gain more autonomy in their judgments. The 
participation of several qāḍīs from the late Umayyad and early Abbasid period in the 
transmission of similar ḥadīths suggests that they were interested in highlighting the 
eschatological dangers faced by judges.35 By insisting on personal responsibility of judges 
before God, both theoreticians and practitioners of Islamic law may have attempted to 
undermine the authority of political rulers (governors, caliphs) over judges. This was the first 
step on a long path which eventually led to the first formulation of a theory of judicial 
autonomy of judgeship in the fourth/tenth century.36  
 
3. Anticipating the Divine Judgment: A Social Means of Pressure? 
 
3.1. The Qāḍīs’ Receptivity to Eschatological Threats 
According to narrative sources, the idea that serving as a judge would jeopardize the soul 
in the hereafter spread at an early date in the milieu of legal scholars. Did Muslim judges 
believe these sayings that threatened them with God’s wrath—be it in the form of popular 
sayings or, later, as more formal ḥadīths? A few historical reports suggest that the fear of 
divine punishment at times instilled real fear in the minds of qāḍīs. According to Ibn ʿAsākir, 
the Companion Abū l-Dardā’ (d. 32/652?), who became one of the first qāḍīs of Damascus, 
                                                     
34 J. van Ess, “La liberté du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIIIe siècle,” in La notion de liberté au Moyen 
Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985), 27. 
35 Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, 628. 
36 Ibid., 633ff. 
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asked his camel not to sue him before God on the Last Judgment, for he had never maltreated 
it.37 When ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥujayra (69–83/688-89–702) was appointed as qāḍī of Fusṭāṭ, 
in Egypt, his father is reported to have said: “We belong to God and to Him we will return 
(Qur’ān, 2:156)! This man is lost!”38 In the late seventh century, the Kūfan judge ʿAbd Allāh 
b. ʿUtba (65–67/684-85–686-87?) is supposed to have refused a favor that someone, 
presumably a litigant, had asked him in secret, arguing that he would be condemned to burn in 
hell if he accepted.39 According to Wakīʿ, the Baṣran judge Iyās b. Muʿāwiya (95–101/713–
720?) wept when he learnt of a report—not yet attributed to the Prophet—informing that only 
one qāḍī out of three would go to paradise.40 A little later, the qāḍī of Damascus, Yazīd b. Abī 
Mālik (d. 130/747–48?), stated that any man who believes in God and in the Last Judgment 
shall see God’s face on the Day of resurrection, except the arbiter (ḥakam) who is unjust in 
his rulings due to his blindness.41 
 
3.2. Eschatology as a Means of Pressure 
Religious, pious opposition was especially keen to spread eschatological threats about 
qāḍīs. Scholars reproached them for being too close to the government (al-sulṭān); they 
claimed the qāḍīs had betrayed their knowledge by accepting to serve the ruler as judges. 
Pious men began threatening qāḍīs with hell as early as the Umayyad period. Wakīʿ relates 
how the Baṣran ascetic (zāhid) Muḥammad b. Wāsiʿ al-Azdī (d. 123/741 or 127/744-45)42 
went to the qāḍī Bilāl b. Abī Burda (110–20/728–38) to warn him that the judge’s own father, 
Abū Burda,43 had accordingly transmitted a prophetic ḥadīth: “There is in hell a valley called 
Habhab,44 where God could place any tyrant (jabbār).” Then he told him: “Beware, Bilāl, not 
to be one of those whom He will place there!”45 In the third/ninth century, the predicator 
Ghulām Khalīl (d. 275/888)46 belonged to those who “insulted judges and testified against 
them that they would go to hell.”47 The verb “to testify” (shahida), a judicial term, suggests 
that pious scholars like Ghulām Khalīl regarded judges’ trials before God as inevitable 
conclusions already underway.  
In Oriental Christianity as well as in Islamic ḥadīth, the image of judges being judged by 
God was used first and foremost by the highest authorities (bishops/ʿulamā’) in order to 
                                                     
37 Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh Madīnat Dimashq (ed. ʿUmar b. Gharāma al-ʿAmrawī; 80 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 
1995), 47:185. 
38 Al-Kindī, Akhbār quḍāt Miṣr, in Kitāb al-wulāt wa-kitāb al-quḍāt (ed. R. Guest; Leiden: Brill, 1912), 315. 
French translation by M. Tillier, Histoire des cadis égyptiens (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 
2012), 66. 
39 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:406. 
40 Ibid., 1:313. Cf. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb al-ashrāf (ed. Suhayl Zakkār and Riyāḍ Ziriklī; 13 vols.; Beirut: Dār 
al-fikr, 1996), 11:339. 
41 Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh Madīnat Dimashq, 65:293. 
42 On this scholar, see supra, footnote 28. 
43 On this follower, see J. Schacht, “al-Ashʿarī, Abū Burda,” Encyclopaedia of Islam (2d ed.), 1:693. 
44 On this valley, see Lange, Justice, 160. 
45 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 2:25. 
46 On this scholar, see C. Melchert, “The Transition from Asceticism to Mysticism at the Middle of the Ninth 
Century C.E.,” Studia Islamica 83 (1996): 65–66. 
47 Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik li-maʿrifat aʿlām madhhab Mālik (ed. Aḥmad Bakīr 
Maḥmūd; 4 vols.; Beirut-Tripoli: Dār maktabat al-ḥayāt-Dār maktabat al-fikr, 1967), 3:172. 
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develop a judicial system that respected the very laws they were trying to impose on society. 
Islamic sources, however, show that this image did not necessarily emanate from the top. At 
the level of the ordinary people, litigants also appropriated the idea that qāḍīs were 
accountable for their decisions before God. Several reports dating from the first centuries of 
Islam illustrate the practical use of this eschatological responsibility in Islamic courts. 
In the early second/eighth century, the Medinese judge Saʿd b. Ibrāhīm al-Zuhrī (appointed 
in 104/722-23?) warned a poet called Qind/Find that he would punish him severely if he 
carried on leading a dissolute life. One day, the qāḍī heard Qind singing (which could already 
be regarded as reprehensible) and discovered that he was also drinking. Without any lawsuit 
or other evidence, the judge immediately ordered to seize him and to inflict upon him a harsh 
punishment. The poet tried to provoke the judge’s mercy and compassion by appealing to the 
example of some of his illustrious ancestors. When he saw that his appeal produced no effect, 
the poet changed his strategy and pleaded: “I beg you, for the sake of these young men who 
will go to hell, and to whom you belong yourself!” He even called him “scorpions’ tails,” an 
insult which referred literally to the long and curved moustaches of the qāḍī, but which could 
also be interpreted as a curse, his moustaches foreshadowing the scorpions that are supposed 
to pullulate in hell.48 We do not know if this appeal was successful – a certain doubt lingers 
that it was not. In Egypt too, during the same 720s, a litigant dissatisfied with a judge’s 
handling of his complaint, reminded him that the just God was looking at him while he 
dispensed justice. Here again the strategy failed and the qāḍī threw the insolent litigant in 
jail.49 
A few decades later, a poet played upon the judge’s fear of damnation in a more successful 
way. The growing influence of traditionalism, in the second part of the second/eighth 
century,50 had probably led to a larger dissemination of threatening ḥadīths against rulers in 
general or qāḍīs in particular. As a result, judges sometimes became more receptive to such 
pleads. In Mecca, around 170/786, judge Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Awqaṣ al-
Makhzūmī prayed one day in the mosque and begged (daʿā) God to release him from the 
punishment of hell. A poet called al-Dārimī had previously brought a case before the judge, 
but the latter was reluctant to give a decision. When he heard the judge’s prayer, the poet 
exclaimed: “Do you deserve to be absolved? No, by God! May God not give you this favor, 
praise be upon Him!” He then identified himself and reproached the judge for his injustice. 
“Do not say that!” the qāḍī said immediately. “I decide in your favor!”51 Playing with the 
judge’s fear of divine punishment helped the poet obtain the judgment that he had been 
seeking without success. 
In late eighth-century Egypt, a poet (called Isḥāq b. Muʿādh b. Mujāhid b. Khayr) went to 
judge al-Mufaḍḍal b. Faḍāla for a lawsuit. Instead of taking out from his sleeve the petition 
which he had prepared for the qāḍī, he took out a satiric poem in which he was threatening al-
Mufaḍḍal: “Fear God and listen to me, Mufaḍḍal, for you will have to answer for your 
                                                     
48 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:165. On scorpions in hell, see Lange, Justice, 128, 129, 135, 141. 
49 Al-Kindī, Akhbār quḍāt Miṣr, 341 / trans. 96. 
50 “Traditionalism” refers here to the trend of aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, in which scholars would found their 
jurisprudence exclusively on ḥadīth. See C. Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th 
Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1. 
51 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 1:264. 
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judgments (ʿan faṣl al-qaḍā’ sa-tus’al)!”52 Was it really a mistake, or did the poet do it on 
purpose? Be that as it may, it did not work this time: the qāḍī became angry when he read 
those lines and expelled the poet from the courtroom.53 In another poem, Isḥāq b. Muʿādh 
attacked again the same qāḍī: “You will have to stand [before God] (mawqūf) and to give an 
account [of your deeds] (muḥāsab)!”54 Subsequent verses directly accused the qāḍī of acting 
unjustly when the poet lodged a complaint before him.55 Later, another poet composed a 
satirical piece about the qāḍī al-ʿUmarī (185–94/801–10) in which he reproached him for his 
injustice and added: “Do not be in a hurry, O Abū l-Nadā,56 for you are running to your death. 
Certainly, hooked sticks sent from hell will catch you when you die.”57 
Poets did not only threaten qāḍīs with divine punishment. By spreading satirical verses 
directed against judges, they could sully their reputations and cast doubt on their ability to 
render justice. In other words, they could transform a qāḍī’s life into a social hell on earth. It 
is probably not by chance, therefore, that poets figure prominently in such reports. For a 
renowned poet, announcing the judge’s trial in the hereafter was part of a wider rhetorical 
strategy with which he could put pressure on qāḍīs and obtain, at least, a just ruling. More 
than anyone else, poets could translate eschatological threats into social ones. 
It is remarkable, however, that external pressure and recalls of divine punishment were not 
always necessary. If we believe certain narrative sources that insist on exemplary behavior 
and piety of exceptional judges, the idea that they would be put on trial for their judicial 
practice was deeply rooted in some qāḍīs’ minds. According to al-Subkī, in early tenth-
century Egypt, two litigants came one day to the Shāfiʿī judge Abū ʿUbayd ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn 
b. Ḥarb (293–311/906–24) disputing about a debt. One of them, called Ibrāhīm, had borrowed 
five dinars from a friend but could not repay him. When they entered the courtroom, however, 
Ibrāhīm spoke faster than his creditor and claimed that the latter actually owed him some 
money. The creditor was so surprised that he burst into laughter. The judge got angry at this 
reaction and shouted: “What are you laughing at? May God end your joy forever, for heaven’s 
sake! How do you dare laugh in a court (majlis) in which God is looking at you? You are 
laughing while your judge is between paradise and hell!” The judge decided to pay the 
reclaimed debt to Ibrāhīm out of his own money and ordered both litigants to leave the 
court.58 
The Islamic judicial system and its theoretically definitive decisions, with no formal 
system of appeal,59 gave judges an important power over society. Litigants who feared 
injustice could sometimes bring their complaints directly before political authorities (during 
maẓālim hearings), but most of the time the main means of pressure to obtain a just ruling was 
                                                     
52 Al-Kindī, Akhbār quḍāt Miṣr, 379 / trans. 143. 
53 Ibid., 380 / trans. 143. 
54 Ibid., 380 / trans. 144. 
55 Ibid., 380–81/ trans. 144. 
56 A nickname which referred to a famous thief at that time. Ibid., 401 / trans. 168. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā (ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ 
Muḥammad al-Ḥulw; 10 vols.; Cairo: Dār iḥyā’ al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya, n.d.), 3:453. On Abū ʿUbayd, see also 
M. Tillier, Vies des cadis de Miṣr (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 2002), 85–97. 
59 B. Johansen, “Le jugement comme preuve : preuve juridique et vérité religieuse dans le droit islamique 
hanéfite,” Studia Islamica 72 (1990): 13–15. 
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to appeal to the judge’s personal responsibility before God. If we believe the last narrative by 
al-Subkī, common efforts of pious men and litigants (especially those who had poetical skills) 
brought about some results, and some qāḍīs preferred paying out of their own pocket rather 
than running the risk of rendering a wrong decision.  
 
4. Qāḍīs’ Piety: When God Attends the Earthly Court 
Muslim judges’ sense of responsibility before God carried wide implications for the court 
in terms of its organization. From the early Abbasid period (second half of the eighth century 
C.E.), textual evidence suggests that some qāḍīs were explicitly placing themselves under 
God’s supervision when dispensing justice—usually in the mosque. The judge of Kūfa Sharīk 
b. ʿAbd Allāh (153–69 or 170/770–785-6 or 786-7) used to read in silence a petition (ruqʿa) 
that he took from his archive-box (qimaṭr) at the beginning of every hearing. The petition, 
which may have been sent by a litigant, carried an admonition to the judge, urging him to 
follow the right path and to fear the Last Judgment.60 Sharīk’s successor in Kūfa, al-Qāsim b. 
Maʿn, referred to a petition he kept in his qimaṭr, upon which were written three poetic verses 
asking him to show respect to morality and religion.61 In Arabic sources, those verses are 
alternatively attributed to the qāḍī himself or to the poet Saʿīd b. Ḥamīd (d. 250/864?).62 Even 
if it had been initially sent by a litigant, the fact that the judge read the petition every day 
suggests that the idea of his own judgment in the hereafter served as a guide or governing 
principle to his presiding over the court. Such behavior at the beginning of hearings was later 
theorized in Islamic law. In his Adab al-qāḍī—the first surviving handbook on judicial 
administration—the Ḥanafī jurist al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874) recommended that qāḍīs open 
judicial hearings by a ritual prayer of two rakʿas. He should then ask (yadʿū) God to assist 
him (an yuwaffiqa-hu), to guide him toward what is right, and to prevent him from disobeying 
his commands.63 
Qāḍīs were only human beings, prone to committing mistakes and therefore susceptible to 
being judged for such lapses. This idea penetrated the Islamic conception of justice to the 
extent that the whole material organization of the court was affected. Generally speaking, 
judicial administration was reinforced under the Abbasids. Centralization of appointments, 
salary increases, and professionalization of judgeship gradually gave the qāḍīs a high 
standing. This had an impact on the way they held their hearings. As important rulers, judges 
came to abandon simple furniture made of rush mats upon which Umayyad qāḍīs usually sat. 
Instead, they adopted more luxurious carpets and cushions which allowed them to sit in a 
higher and more visible position. This pomp was representative of their belonging to the high-
                                                     
60 Al-Khaṭīb, Ta’rīkh Madīnat al-Salām (ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf; 17 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-gharb al-
islāmī, 2001), 10:399. Cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa-l-umam (ed. Suhayl Zakkār; 13 
vols.; Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1995), 5:419. 
61 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:178. 
62 Al-Marzubānī, Nūr al-qabas al-mukhtaṣar min al-muqtabas (ed. R. Sellheim; Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 
1964), 280; al-Māwardī, Adab al-dunyā wa-l-dīn (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1987), 111. On this poet, see 
Kh.-D. al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām:Qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisā’ min al-ʿarab wa-l-mustaʿribīn wa-l-
mustashriqīn (8 vols.; Beirut: Dār al-ʿilm li-l-malāyīn, 1997), 3:93. 
63 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb adab al- qāḍī (ed. F. Ziyāda; Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1978), 85–
86. 
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standing state apparatus, and, on a symbolic level, established them as equals to other state 
appointees such as financial or military governors.64 
There was, however, resistance to this evolution. For some reason, certain qāḍīs rejected 
such secular symbols of their office. In the early ninth century, the Baghdadi judge ʿAlī b. 
Ẓabyān refused the comfortable carpets used by his predecessors and seated himself on a 
simple mat of reeds (bāriya).65 A few decades later, ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Khalanjī 
(qāḍī of al-Sharqiyya, a quarter of Baghdad, 228–237/842-3–851-2) also created an ascetic 
judicial theatre, as if he wanted to magnify the religious nature of his office. Wakīʿ, and later 
Ibn ʿAsākir, describe how this judge sat in the mosque at the foot of a column. Between two 
lawsuits, he relaxed his back on the column and remained totally motionless until the next 
litigants arrived.66  
Through such ascetic attitude, the qāḍī showed how his personal piety guided his judicial 
practice: he would be able to stand before God without fear on the Day of Judgment. There 
was, however, a discrepancy between this pious attitude and the political reality of judgeship. 
Al-Khalanjī was qāḍī at a time when judges’ authority over Muslim society was reinforced by 
their role in the miḥna (inquisition): they were asked by the caliphate to examine witnesses 
(shuhūd) and to reject testimony of those who did not believe in the theological dogma of 
creation of the Qur’ān. Their role in this inquisition, which had important economic and social 
consequences, was bitterly resented by many Muslims. Al-Khalanjī’s attitude could therefore 
appear to be hypocritical. Some people, at least, did not take him seriously and took revenge 
by making fun of him. One day, jokers put some glue on the part of the column where the 
judge used to lay his head between two trials. When al-Khalanjī sat up, his turban stuck to the 
column and the qāḍī remained bare-headed—a most degrading humiliation.67 The ascetic 
attitude of some judges was criticized in an ironic manner, in the same period, by al-Jāḥiẓ 
(d. 255/868-69) in his famous depiction of the qāḍī of Baṣra ʿAbd Allāh b. Sawwār (192–
98/807-8–813-14). According to al-Jāḥiẓ, this pious judge could sit all day long, straight and 
motionless, without moving a muscle and talking as little as possible.68 By not moving, the 
qāḍī probably wished to meet the requirements of Islamic law by avoiding any ambiguous 
movement that could otherwise have been interpreted as his preference for one litigant over 
another.69 With his ascetic posture, he embodied righteousness and justice before God and the 
Muslim people. However, al-Jāḥiẓ suggests that his exaggerated attitude was actually a sign 
of megalomania and could even appear as blasphemous: what human being could pretend to 
command such full control of his body? The qāḍī had to acknowledge his weakness when, 
one day, a simple fly landed on his nose and annoyed him to such an extent that he eventually 
lost his temper. The almighty God had recalled him to more humility.70  
                                                     
64 See my forthcoming book, Rendre la justice aux deux premiers siècles de l’Islam. 
65 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:286; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam, 5:562. 
66 Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh Dimashq, 32:379–80. Cf. Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:290. 
67 Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh Dimashq, 32:379–80. Cf. Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, 3:290. 
68 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-ḥayawān (ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn; 8 vols.; Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-
Ḥalabī, 1965), 3:343-44.  
69 M. Tillier, “La société abbasside au miroir du tribunal : égalité juridique et hiérarchie sociale,” Annales 
Islamologiques 42 (2008): 158. 
70 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-ḥayawān, 3:344–45. 
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Conclusion 
God was the lawgiver in early Islam. Implementation of His law, however, was in the 
hands of human beings who were prone to occasional mistakes, and easily influenced by 
passions and wayward social and political networks that could lead them astray. Qāḍīs were 
appointed by political rulers (i.e., provincial governors and caliphs), and in practice Muslim 
subjects had very few means of exerting pressure against an unjust judge. If they could not 
easily appeal to the ruler, they could at least appeal to the judge’s sense of responsibility. 
Muslims drew on eschatological thinking, which expanded the Qur’ānic idea of divine 
judgment on the Day of Resurrection. The divine courtroom reflected the earthly one; 
however, by a mirror effect, roles were reversed in the afterlife. Judges would be judged, and 
victims of judges would testify against them. God’s court was the last and definitive court of 
appeal.  
This image, which has parallels in Syrian canon law, spread probably as early as the 
Umayyad period in the form of sayings or/and prophetic traditions. Pious scholars who 
opposed corrupted practices of judges and their commitment with secular authorities were 
especially keen to promulgate these sayings and to emphasize the spiritual dangers that 
threatened qāḍīs. Examples from the late eighth and ninth centuries C.E. suggest that judges 
were (or became) receptive to these threats. Litigants fearing an unjust ruling reminded their 
judges of their fate, and some judges would apparently pay from their own monies rather than 
take the risk of rendering a wrong decision. Avoiding judgment through fear of God’s wrath 
developed simultaneously in Jewish courts, where amicable settlements became the rule.71 
This practice remained probably an exception in Islamic courts. Some jurists argued that 
judges who always relied on appearances to give their judgment had nothing to fear: they 
would be rewarded by God for their effort (ijtihād) even if they had pronounced a wrong 
decision.72 It is clear, however, that this image of a Muslim judge appearing before God had a 
certain impact on the organization of the courts. Whereas there was general tendency, under 
the Abbasids, to highlight the judges’ authority over the community, some qāḍīs adopted an 
ascetic behavior and rejected secular signs of their authority. Fear, modesty, and humility 
would not save them from committing any mistake, but it would, at least, save them from 
God’s wrath. 
                                                     
71 S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the 
Documents of the Cairo Geniza: Volume II, The Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 
334–35. 
72 Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla (ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir; n.p.: Dār al-fikr, n.d.), 494, 496–97. 
